

ANNEX B: FORCE STRUCTURE (ORGANIZATIONS)

Overview

Through a trained and ready force, the Army provides the Nation a full-spectrum force, maintaining our nonnegotiable contract with the American people to fight and win the Nation's wars. To do this, **the Army meets the requirements** articulated in the National Security Strategy (NSS), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). **The Army also is transforming**, as part of the Joint Force, becoming more strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of operations.

The Army is comprised of Active (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) Soldiers and civilians. In FY03-04, it is organized into four corps, 18 divisions (10 AC and 8 Army National Guard (ARNG)), 15 ARNG enhanced separate brigades, and two ARNG strategic brigades (Figure 1). The Army requires adequate funding through FY09 for an AC end strength of approximately 480,000 Soldiers, an RC end strength of approximately 555,000 Soldiers (350,000 ARNG and 205,000 U.S. Army Reserve (USAR)), and a civilian workforce of approximately 222,000 personnel.




Figure 1. FY04 Army Military Force Structure

Army Transformation

The **Army's Transformation** provides strategically responsive land forces to joint and coalition forces that are dominant across the full spectrum of operations. The **main effort** of Army Transformation is the **Objective Force**, a force that is responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable and sustainable across the full spectrum of operations. The **Army focuses** its science and technology (S&T) investment on materiel enablers for the Objective Force, such as Comanche and the Future Combat Systems (FCS). Simultaneously, the Army is fielding an **Interim (Stryker) Force** of six brigade-size combat teams that will meet the near-term requirements in support of warfighting Combatant Commanders by bridging the capability gap between our light and heavy legacy forces. These Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) will also serve as a bridge to the Objective Force. Throughout Transformation, the Army **continues** to selectively modernize and recapitalize the **Legacy Force** in order to retain significant overmatch over current and potential adversaries.

There are three major aspects of the ongoing Army Transformation from a force structure perspective. The first is the **redesign** of the Army (operating and generating forces) to achieve the Objective Force before the end of this decade. In this domain, the Army activated two SBCTs and will activate four more (one of which will be in the RC) between now and FY08. Additionally, the Army is on a firm path to activate the first Objective Force unit in FY08. For the RC, the Army National Guard Restructuring Initiative (AGRI) introduces two lighter, more mobile organizations: the Multifunctional Division (MFD) and the Mobile Light Brigade (MLB). AGRI's new

organizations are a bridge to the Objective Force for the RC forces. As a supporting effort to the creation of the Objective Force, the Army is redesigning its force generation forces (i.e., institutional force and infrastructure) to gain advantages in force development, force projection, force management and force sustainment. This redesign is reshaping the business rules of the Army, allowing operational forces to reach back into strategic and national capabilities through enhanced communications and data exchange systems. Efficiencies gained in this area allow the Army to minimize theater-required capabilities while reducing strategic lift requirements normally placed on the Army's sister Services. The Army also adjusts current organizations to become more effective and efficient for the full spectrum of military operations, thus ensuring that we capitalize on all technological, doctrinal and organizational developments to ensure optimal mission accomplishment.

Secondly, the Army **reinvests** efficiencies gained across the current stock of capabilities and organizations into those organizations that are most critical to Combatant Commanders. The overhaul of our personnel and logistical systems creates efficiencies in force structure that are then reinvested within operational forces to sharpen the package of capabilities required to fight and win the current Global War on Terrorism and posture the Army for future operations.

Lastly, the Army **rebalances** itself by changing the mix of AC and RC forces to quickly meet operational availability and rotational demands placed on the Army. The Army ensures that high-demand/low-density organizations are rotated on a total force basis. The Army uses the Total Army Analysis process to rebalance the capabilities and organizations between AC and RC.

These three aspects (force redesign, reinvestment and rebalancing), taken in the aggregate, enable the Army to dynamically recast its forces to meet the needs of the NSS, Combatant Commanders, and Army commanders in an austere fiscal environment with acceptable risk. Army capabilities supporting the Combatant Commands are enduring. The Army assesses these demands to our current and future forces and determines how best to resource them. In many cases, due to constraints in Army end strength and Total Obligation Authority (TOA), the Army is strained in such a way that full resourcing of all demands placed on the Army is unattainable within current end strength/TOA. Although these constraints are significant, the Army ensures that we do what is right for our people, maintains readiness and transforms to a future, more strategically relevant Army every day.

A key piece of Army Transformation **to directly support becoming a more strategically relevant** force is **Logistics Transformation**. **The goals of our Logistics Transformation** are to ensure Army forces are capable of rapidly deploying in support of current and future operational force deployment objectives, effectively sustaining a full-spectrum Army while synchronizing Army and joint efforts to:

- Enhance strategic responsiveness—meet deployment timelines.
- Optimize sustainment capabilities while minimizing the footprint.
- Reduce the cost of generating and sustaining forces while maintaining warfighting capability and readiness.

The Army's ability to support the NSS remains central to determining force structure requirements as we plan and execute Army

Transformation. The Army is leveraging information technology and is structuring a totally integrated force, sized and shaped to meet worldwide commitments.

Total Army Analysis and Strategic Planning

The Army plans its force structure based on the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process in accordance with strategic war plans. Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 (QDR01), completed and published in September 2001, had a significant impact on the Army's Total Army Analysis 2009 (TAA09). Its effect on Total Army Analysis 2011 (TAA11) will be even greater. The QDR report provides a new capabilities-based strategy and a new force-planning construct that served as the basis for TAA09. The May 2002 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and the September 2002 NSS reemphasized the new strategy. The strategy has four elements designed to give the Nation a broad set of capabilities to advance and defend our national interests in both peace and war. The elements of the new strategy are: assuring our allies and friends, dissuading adversaries, deterring aggression and coercion, and decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails. The force-planning construct set forth in QDR01 replaces the QDR97 "2-MTW" construct with a 1-4-2-1 strategy of protect the homeland ("1"), deter forward in four critical regions ("4"), swiftly defeat adversaries in two near-simultaneous conflicts ("2"), while preserving for the President the option of decisively defeating one of those adversaries ("1"). QDR01 also specifically notes a requirement to maintain sufficient force generation capability, as well as a strategic reserve and the need for rotational forces to support small-scale contingency (SSC) operations.

QDR01, the Defense Planning Guidance, and the National Security Strategy do not change the Army's AC or RC structure or end strength. They clearly articulate homeland security as the highest priority. Additionally, a QDR01 and Defense Planning Guidance directed study will address the roles and missions, forces, and resources for the RC. The new strategy also strongly supports the Army's Interim and Objective Forces. It emphasizes accelerated development of new operational concepts, organizations, and capabilities as part of Transformation. This includes improving the capability of forward-deployed forces to win rapidly and decisively with minimal reinforcement, enhance strategic responsiveness, and ease the sustainment burden of reinforcing units. However, it also highlights the requirement to "divest ourselves of legacy forces" while we transform. The Transformation process for the total Army is a long-term process (approximately 25 years), and divestiture must be accomplished while maintaining adequate forces in a go-to-war-today capability.

September 11 and the Global War on Terrorism confirmed the Army was prepared to answer the call. These events are causing the Army to reexamine field commanders' needs, especially in force and homeland protection. Results will be incorporated into Army force prioritization. TAA09 was completed on a compressed timeline with the results approved on 26 June 2002. TAA11 is scheduled for May 2002 to November 2003 on a timeline that will allow for better coordination and review of Army requirements for input to the FY06-11 Plan.

Operating Force Structure

The Army's operating force must be sufficient in both size and capabilities to meet all requirements contained in the new defense strategy to provide the Nation with a full range

of land force capabilities in support of current and future joint warfighting constructs.

The operating force is the warfighting portion of the Army—the force that fights and wins the Nation's wars by providing the combat capability necessary to sustain land dominance. The operating force accounts for approximately 79 percent of the Army.

The Army is fully engaged in daily activities supporting the new defense strategy, providing forces for joint operations. The Combatant Commanders routinely employ the Army as their force of choice in executing theater cooperative security arrangements. Maintaining our overseas presence and cooperative activities promotes regional stability and gives substance to our security commitments. Additionally, the Army serves as a role model for militaries of emerging democracies and promotes internal stability and democratic growth for such nations.

Generating Forces

Under Title 10, the Army's generating force has responsibility for providing the management, development, readiness, deployment and sustainment of the operating force (Figure 2).

TAA11 will be the first effort to deliberately capture and approve generating force requirements at HQDA. Processes have been developed to link the generating force structure to the operating force. These efforts will capture and validate generating force requirements against Title 10 functions and capabilities, as defined in DA PAM 100-1, across the Army's institutional base, industrial base and infrastructure. The Army's generating force consists of approximately 2,400 units and is comprised of the effective combination of military, Department of the Army (DA) civilian and contract personnel. The generating force,




Figure 2. Army Generating Forces

like the operating force, is resourced within programmed end strength. Since both forces must compete against the same resource pool, management of workforce mix (military, civilian and contractor personnel) within the generating force is critical. Historically, the generating force has used approximately 20 percent of the total military end strength across all three components.

Redesign of the institutional force is an integral part of the overall Army Transformation Strategy. In December 2001, the Secretary of the Army announced his decisions on realignment of Headquarters, DA. This realignment began the process of transforming the management and command structure that supports the operational Army. The process of institutional Army reengineering continues with the following goals:

- Divest nonessential functions, remove unnecessary layering and duplication, and consolidate functions; resource in the most cost-effective manner; and privatize/ outsource functions where applicable.
- Transform Army Headquarters (corps through MACOM).
- Reallocate resources supporting core competencies; fully integrate those resources across the Army, other Services, and DoD.
- Reduce acquisition cycles by at least half, anticipating the needs of future organizations; complete major acquisitions within three budget cycles.
- Create and sustain a customer-focused learning organization that evaluates itself,

eliminates obsolete structures, and designs better processes.

- Rapidly create and project an appropriate and capable force to any area of the world.
- Accomplish the reengineered generating force within the Army Vision.

Department of the Army Civilian Personnel

Department of the Army civilians (DAC) are major contributors to the Army's overall mission, comprising approximately 18 percent of the workforce and occupying vital support positions in all Army operations. More importantly, civilians provide stability and institutional knowledge regardless of the organizational level to which they are assigned, from senior management to administrative support. This is particularly true in the area of depot-level maintenance, supply, combat developments, acquisition, training, medical care, research and development, and facilities operations. The civilian workforce is a cornerstone of the Army's CONUS-based, power projection strategy. With the overall tempo of Army operational deployments and mission requirements ever increasing, the civilian workforce decline of recent years has been halted. The final structure of the Army civilian workforce will be affected by the manning recommendations currently under review in support of the Transformation Strategy initiatives.

Division XXI Formations

Division XXI and the interim step, Limited Conversion Division, are FY99 force structure actions that began to lighten the Army's heavy forces. They optimize force structure by building on information dominance. They apply the concept of technology enablers that add

capability to a combat system. The Army currently plans to field two Force XXI divisions and an accompanying armored cavalry regiment.

As of this fiscal year, these initiatives have already reduced requirements for many of the heavy system platforms in five of the six AC heavy division units, five of the seven ARNG heavy divisions, and all seven ARNG heavy separate brigades. These initiatives have not only lightened the Army's heavy forces (reducing the strategic lift requirements for affected divisions by 11 percent), but have also provided systems for "cascading" across the force to improve the overall modernization posture. The actions embedded in the Army Vision will further guide how we transform the Army to a more responsive, flexible, and capable force.

Transformation Formations

The Army began the Transformation process in early 2000 at Fort Lewis, WA. The first two units are already organized as SBCTs. The six named Interim Force units are (listed in conversion order) the 3rd Brigade 2nd Infantry Division, the 1st Brigade 25th Infantry Division, the 172nd Infantry Brigade, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, the 2nd Brigade 25th Infantry Division and the 56th Brigade 28th Infantry Division (Pennsylvania National Guard).

This SBCT force (Figure 3) will greatly enhance the Army's ability to be dominant at every point of the operational spectrum. In addition to its strategic deployability, this force will be operationally deployable with its vehicles capable of movement within a theater via U.S. Air Force family of tactical aircraft. Combining technological overmatch with quality leadership, people, and training provides the warfighting Combatant Commanders a land force capable of deterring, containing, stabilizing or decisively terminating a crisis.




Figure 3. The SBCT

Using a single family of vehicles to equip a brigade size unit with all of its armored fighting vehicle strength is new to our Army. The **Stryker** family of vehicles allows the Army to put more force structure at the "tip of the spear" and reduces training and sustainment complexity. Reducing the variety of combat vehicles in a brigade-size force simplifies Army force structure and should reduce the "overhead" required to properly support the "tip of the spear."

Additionally, concepts for the Objective Force Army already exist. The Army Unit of Action and the Army Unit of Employment are envisioned as the organizational constructs for the future Objective Force. Refinement and implementation of these concepts in a deployable go-to-war Army force structure before the end of this decade are key goals of Army Transformation.

Aviation Transformation

In addition to ground maneuver transformation, the Army is also in the process of transforming its aviation assets for 21st century operations.

A primary objective of Aviation Transformation is divestiture of legacy systems to prepare for Objective Force systems. The Army has completed divestiture of its older attack airframe (AH-1) and will complete divestiture of its older utility airframe (UH-1) in combat deployable units by 2004. This entails the inactivation of all four corps light utility helicopter battalions and two attack battalions. All of these units are equipped with older airframes. Similar to the ground simplification of reducing the numbers of types of systems in service, Army Aviation will also have the eventual benefit of greatly reduced types of training and sustainment packages required. Additionally, the Army is redesigning two of its ARNG divisional organic aviation brigades to combat support structure. Another key element in Army Aviation Transformation is the transformation of Army Special Operations Aviation (ARSOA). The future ARSOA structure will be fully capable of supporting strategic national missions as well as the full spectrum of military operations. Realigning forces to forward bases in the Theater Combatant Commanders' areas of responsibility provides for maximum flexibility and minimal response time for response to crises. Army Aviation Transformation pursues

a strategy of downsizing in order to bring on board more modern, capable airframes.

Medical Reengineering Initiative

The Medical Reengineering Initiative (MRI) reorganizes deployable medical forces at corps and echelon above corps. MRI provides support not only to the Interim Force but also provides the transitional pathway for support to the Objective Force. The MRI organizational structure provides improved tactical mobility, reduced footprint, and increased modularity for flexible task organization that promotes scalability through easily tailored, capabilities-based packages. This modular design easily accommodates augmentation packages to permit rapid integration of additional enabling capabilities. MRI also provides the requisite organizational platform for Medical Communications for Combat Casualty Care (MC4). The synergy of MRI and MC4 will fuel Army Transformation in several ways. At objective state, this digitized organization will distribute a common operational picture of patients, medical capabilities, medical supply and medical threats in a nonlinear, noncontiguous battlespace. The resultant command and control will provide scalable, seamless, multidisciplinary combat health support for joint, multinational, and interagency operations both within the homeland and around the globe.

Military Intelligence Theater Transformation

The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is transitioning its force projection brigades into multicomponent theater intelligence brigades and/or groups (TIB/TIG) for each Army Service Component Command.

The TIB/TIG plans, coordinates, manages and executes intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) operations, all source intelligence analysis, production, collection management and dissemination for the Army Service Component Command and Army Forces (ARFOR) in a theater of operations. The TIB/TIG has three missions. First, it provides dedicated long-term/continuous support to the unified or sub-unified command in support of the Combatant Commanders' Theater Security Cooperation Plans. Second, the TIB/TIG provides in-theater intelligence for deploying ARFOR. Finally, it has the capability to provide both theater indications and warning support, and intelligence support to counterterrorism operations.

TIB/TIG force conversion provides dedicated theater-level intelligence assets and enables the Army to be strategically responsive and dominant across the full spectrum of operations by providing advanced indications and warning, a tailored ability to shape the operational environment through continuous engagement and a theater-level intelligence force postured for both contemporary and future operational environments.

Reserve Component

The RC constitutes approximately 54 percent of the total Army end strength. The Army force structure goal is to have all AC and RC elements be interchangeable. Nevertheless, there are several force structure programs that highlight the Army's RC.

Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRS) and Army National Guard Restructuring Initiative (AGRI)

The ARNG continues execution of the ARNG Division Redesign Study (ADRS). This concept converts noncritical ARNG combat

forces to combat support (CS)/combat service support (CSS) forces required to support the Army's warfighting requirements. ADRS Phases I and II are fully resourced and programmed in the FY04-09 Plan. The total cost for Phases I and II is \$2.3 billion and approximately 22,000 spaces are converted to CS/CSS units. AGRI is a new initiative whose concept is to convert heavy ARNG divisions into lighter formations more relevant to the new strategy. AGRI will create more robust, flexible, responsive and multifunctional Army divisions and provide a bridge to the transformation of the ARNG into the Objective Force. Funding for both ADRS and AGRI will compete in the FY06-11 Plan and future plans as necessary. The CS/CSS conversions for Phases III and IV of ADRS are dependent on the outcomes of the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process, Logistics Transformation, and the development of the requirements for the Objective Force.

Multi-Component Units (MCU)

MCUs combine personnel and/or equipment from more than one component on a single authorization document. The intent is to maximize integration of AC and RC resources in an austere environment. MCUs have unity of command and control similar to that of single component units. MCU status does not change a unit's doctrinal requirement for personnel and equipment, force packaging, or tiered resourcing. MCU selection is based on mission requirements, unique component capabilities and limitations, readiness implications, efficiencies to be gained, and the

ability and willingness of each component to contribute the necessary resources. Multiple component units are at theater and corps levels and they range from Army Service Component Command units to separate CS/CSS units.

In January 2002, the Reserve Component Coordination Council (RCCC) reviewed the status of the multiple component unit initiative and approved the MACOMs' recommendation to continue with the initiative. The Army continues to refine the mix of Active Army and RC in these units to make them more effective in support of mission requirements.

As of October 2002, there are 60 units documented as multiple component units. Currently, there are an additional 16 units nominated for multiple component unit status from FY04 to FY07. The Active Army is the "flag holder" (sponsoring component) for 36 MCUs; the ARNG is the "flag holder" for three MCUs and the Army Reserve is the "flag holder" for 21 MCUs.

Conclusion

The Army will continue to provide the Nation an array of deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable formations, which are affordable and capable of reversing the conditions of human suffering rapidly and resolving conflicts decisively. To do this, the Army's force structure will be optimized in the context of emerging joint operational concepts, dominant across the full spectrum of operations. The Army's Transformation Strategy provides the means to achieve future success while mitigating current risks.